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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, Debra Williams (hereinafter referred to as "Debra) and defendant, Johnnie 
L. Williams (hereinafter referred to as "Rocky") were married on November 19, 1993. Debra 
had one child at the time of the marriage. Rocky adopted that child shortly after the parties' 
marriage. The parties originally lived in Oregon but moved to Idaho in 2003. The parties owned 
a home in Oregon and sold it in 2002. They reinvested the net proceeds of approximately 
$85,000.00 in a home in Rigby, Idaho in 2003. They made improvements on the property 
including building a barn. The parties lived as husband and wife in Idaho from 2003 until their 
divorce on October 24, 2012. 
Debra filed for divorce on September 9, 2011, alleging irreconcilable differences. Rocky 
filed a counterclaim also alleging irreconcilable differences. Neither party claimed fault as a 
basis or grounds for the divorce. The parties specifically stipulated to a divorce on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences at the commencement of the trial. (See Memorandum Decision, 
page 5, paragraph 14) 
Debra is employed with the Department of Energy earning $98,187.00 per year or 
$8,182.25 gross income per month. Rocky is totally disabled and has been on Social Security 
Disability effective 1992. Rocky's monthly Social Security benefit is $1,315.00 per month. 
Upon entry of the divorce, Rocky will be required to pay approximately $210.00 per month for 
Medicare Parts C and D, thereby reducing his monthly income to approximately $1,090.00 per 
month. (See Memorandum Decision, page 3, paragraphs 6 and 7) 
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Rocky Williams is 5 7 years of age. Rocky is a juvenile diabetic. He is legally blind in 
his left eye because of a detached retina. Rocky has a prosthesis for a right eye. He has ulnar 
damage to both his arms. He has had a kidney transplant and takes anti-rejection medications. 
He has had a pancreas transplant which also requires him to take anti-rejection medications. He 
has artificial knees in both legs, is missing a toe, and has poor balance. It is painful for him to 
walk as he has severe neuropathy in his feet. Rocky has braces for both his shoes which help 
with his mobility. (See Defendant's Exhibit B) 
Vocational expert Dr. Richard Taylor testified that Rocky was occupationally disabled 
and not employable in the competitive market place. 
A divorce trial occurred on August 20 and August 22, 2012, before the Honorable Judge 
Penny J. Stanford. At trial, the Rocky requested an unequal division of property and debts 
and/or an award of maintenance. Rocky also requested payment of his attorney fees by Debra 
pursuant to Idaho Code § § 32-704 and 32-705. Rocky specifically requested that he be awarded 
the community home, or that it be sold, and that Debra be required to pay the community debts. 
The Trial Court entered its Memorandum Decision on September 15, 2012, and entered 
the Decree of Divorce, over Rocky's written objection, on October 24, 2012. Rocky's objection 
to entry of the Decree of Divorce as written was that it did not address the property equalization 
payment from Debra to Rocky. (See Objection to Entry of Decree of Divorce filed on 
October 17, 2012) 
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The Trial Court found specifically that Rocky was fully occupationally disabled, and that 
his only source of income was Social Security Disability. The Trial Court divided the personal 
property and retirement plans agreed upon by stipulation of the parties and by further order for 
those items tried to the Court. The Trial Court awarded the community home to Debra; ordered 
Debra to pay the community debts; and, required Debra to pay maintenance to Rocky in the sum 
of $600.00 per month for five (5) years or until Rocky remarried, died or began residing in an 
assisted living or nursing home facility. Rocky was required to move from the community 
residence thirty (30) days from the entry of the Memorandum Decision on September 5, 2012. 
The Trial Court denied an award of attorney fees to Rocky. 
Rocky filed his final Notice of Appeal on November 1, 2012. 
The District Court issued its Opinion on Appeal on June 17, 2013. 
Rocky filed his Notice of Appeal to this Court on July 19, 2013. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The Trial Court did not adequately prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law 
as required by Idaho Court Rule 52(a). 
2. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by admitting generalized and remote 
allegations of alleged fault against Rocky and utilizing those generalized allegations of alleged 
fault as a basis to deny adequate maintenance and attorney fees to Rocky. 
3. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and fact by not requiring the community 
home be listed for sale and sold to the highest offeror. 
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4. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by not awarding substantial and 
permanent maintenance to Rocky. 
5. The Court erred in not awarding Rocky his attorney's fees and costs in this matter 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 32-704 and 32-705. 
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Rocky hereby requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 32-704 and 
32-705, and any and all other applicable rules and statutes. 
Spouse's receipt in divorce proceedings of assets in form of property division sufficient to 
pay attorney's fees does not necessarily preclude award of attorney's fees to the spouse. Current 
statutes now mandate that courts in divorce proceedings consider elements besides necessity and 
value of assets awarded in property division in deciding whether award of attorney fees is 
appropriate. Even if each party's "financial resources" remains primary factor in evaluation of a 
request for attorney fees, that term means more than balance sheet assets; in its broader meaning, 
it includes income and earning capacity. Stephens v. Stephens, 138 Idaho 195, 61 P.3d 63 (2002) 
Idaho appellate decisions state that a disparity in the income of the parties is generally sufficient 
to justify an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 32-704. Jensen v. Jensen, 128 Idaho at 
606, 917 P.2d at 763 (Idaho 1996); Pieper v. Pieper, 125 Idaho 667, 671, 873 P.2d 921, 925 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
In its amended form, Idaho Code § 32-704(3) now directs the trial courts to look at not 
only the financial resources of the parties but also "the factors set forth in [Idaho Code] 
§32-705," which are enumerated above. Plainly, the current statutes now mandate that courts in 
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divorce proceedings consider elements besides necessity and the value of assets awarded in the 
property division in deciding whether an award of attorney fees is appropriate. Stephens v. 
Stephens, supra. 
In Stephens, supra, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of fault in the context of 
maintenance under Idaho Code§ 32-705. The court found that the fault criteria was met when 
the court found Mr. Stephens guilty of extreme cruelty. Mrs. Stephens pled extreme cruelty, and 
the issue was tried. The magistrate found extreme cruelty and thus the fault requirement under 
Idaho Code§ 32-705(l)(g) was met. I have found no case suggesting that undefined, 
uncategorized, and unspecified fault not pled by one of the parties may be used as an element in 
deciding the award or non-award of maintenance or attorney fees. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. REQUIREMENTS OF IDAHO COURT RULE 52(A) 
FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
In any action tried upon the facts without a jury, the court is required to find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. If an opinion or memorandum 
decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw appear therein. 
A written memorandum decision issued by the Court may constitute the findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw only if the decision expressly so states or if it is thereafter adopted as the 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw by order of the court. 
A reviewing court may reverse the trial court's decision when findings are absent or 
inadequate. Clayton v. State, 118 Idaho 59, 794 P.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1990) 
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Findings of fact and conclusions oflaw properly set forth by the court, must be supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 985 P.2d. 1137 
(1999) 
Clear error will not be deemed to exist if the courts findings are supported by substantial 
and competent, though conflicting evidence. Muniz v. Schrade, 115 Idaho 497, 767 P.2d 1272 
(Ct. App 1989) 
Only where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete understanding 
of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning will the absence of findings of 
fact not result in a remand for adequate findings. Spencer v. Idaho First National Bank, 
106 Idaho 316, 67 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984) 
Unlike review of findings of fact, the appellate court has free review over conclusions of 
law. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d 975 (1997) 
Where a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, not being supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, the finding must be set aside. Moye v. Moye, 102 Idaho 170, 627 P.2d 799 
(1981), Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 Idaho 870, 643 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1982), Lang v. Lang, 109 
Idaho 802, 711 P.2d 1322 (Ct App 1985) 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AS REQUIRED BY IDAHO COURT RULE 52(A) 
The Trial Court herein issued a Memorandum Decision which disregards mention of 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision does not 
comply with Idaho Court Rule 52(a). A written memorandum decision issued by the court may 
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constitute the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw only if the decision expressly so states or if 
it is thereafter adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law by order of the court. 
The Memorandum Decision issued by the Trial Court in this matter does not separately 
state the findings of fact or conclusions oflaw as required by Idaho Court Rule 52(a). The only 
exception to compliance with the mandate of Idaho Court Rule 52(a) is where the existing record 
is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete understanding of the material issues and the 
basis of the magistrate's reasoning. Otherwise, absence of findings of fact will result in a remand 
for adequate findings. The record herein is not clear and in some instances void, as to various 
findings made by the Trial Court. 
Our Court of Appeals made a very pronounced and important observation when it 
addressed the importance of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in Dondelinger 
v. Dondelinger, 107 Idaho 431,690, P.2d 366 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) 
1. 
Most importantly, the requirement of explicit findings encourages 
a trial judge to rely upon objectively supportable grounds for his 
decision, and discourages subjective or attitude-influenced 
perceptions of the case. Without that objective basis, trial court 
fact-finding is, as Judge Jerome Frank once observed, a "soft spot 
in the administration of justice." J. Frank, Courts On Trial 74 
(1950) 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND SEPARATE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
Finding Regarding Community Property And Debt 
The Trial Court specifically found on page 13, paragraph 27 of its Memorandum 
Decision: 
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"Rocky wants half or more of all community property with Debbie 
paying all the house payments and pay all of the community debt, 
and to continue making all his house payments for the rest of his 
life. His position to this court is vindictive, indefensible and 
illogical." 
There is insufficient substantial and competent evidence to support that his request was 
vindictive, indefensible and illogical. There is no objective evidence to support this conclusion. 
It is submitted that this may be one of those subjective, attitude influenced perceptions warned of 
in Dondelinger, supra. Rocky was a long term spouse, who is blind, disabled, and 57 years old 
with significant health issues. Why is it vindictive, indefensible and illogical for a man in his 
circumstances to want a home in which to live and have a decent life? Rocky cannot support 
himself, and is a classic example of a person entitled to substantial and permanent maintenance. 
The evidence clearly establishes Debra's ability to pay, and Rocky's absolute need. However, the 
Trial Court demeaned Rocky and found that it was preferable to burden society with his future 
care and housing costs rather than his long term spouse. 
2. Finding Regarding Fault To Justify Unequal Division Of Property 
The Trial Court found at page 13, paragraph 27 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"It is Rocky's conduct and demands that justify an unequal 
division of property in Debbie's favor." 
The court made no finding at to what conduct to which the court was referring. Whatever 
the conduct, it must have been perceived by the Trial Court to be serious, but without findings of 
fact we will never know. This punitive "finding" was made by the Trial Court even though the 
Trial Court said it was not going to order a divorce on the grounds of fault. It is submitted that 
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this may be another example of subjective attitude influence perceptions which occur when the 
Trial Court fails to perform the objective process of identifying facts. The Trial Court ignored 
the fact that each party agreed that it was a no fault divorce, and abused her discretion in 
pursuing and finding fault. 
3. Finding Regarding Home Value 
The Trial Court found at pages 17 and 18, paragraph 36 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"There is more owing on the home than it is worth." 
There is no evidence in the record other than the testimony of the parties as to their 
determination of the home's value. The market analysis, which is not an appraisal, obtained 
earlier in the year was not the best, most competent evidence on this issue. Debra testified that 
her only basis for her value was the market analysis. Rocky testified that he believed the property 
to be worth $300,000.00 to $350,000.00 based on an appraisal the parties obtained three years 
earlier indicating a value of $300,000.00. (Tr. P. 293, L. 16-25) 
4. Finding Regarding Medicare Coverage For Assisted Living Centers 
The Trial Court found at page 19, paragraph 39 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"Because of his disability Rocky could live in a socially viable, 
functionally appropriate living facility with only minimal expenses 
not covered by Medicare." 
There is no evidence in the record on this issue, and further, Medicare does not pay for 
assisted living centers, only nursing homes which are clearly distinguishable. 
The Trial Court erred in concluding as a matter of law and fact that Medicare paid for 
assisted living centers. The Appellate Court has free review of errors of law. The court can take 
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judicial notice of Medicare regulations which clearly establish that assisted living centers are not 
paid for by Medicare for any individual. It is only when all assets and resources are exhausted 
that one may be placed on Medicaid, and placed in a "nursing home", which is far less desirable. 
5. Finding Regarding Resources And Social Life At Assisted Living Facilities 
The Trial Court found at page 19, paragraph 39 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"At such a facility, or group housing, he would have access to 
resources and sociality which he now lacks and says he wants. He 
would have assistance with basic living issues for which he now 
needs help, such as health monitoring wound monitoring, 
housekeeping, medication management and transportation." 
There is no evidence on this issue, and the court erred in making this finding. 
6. Finding Regarding Rocky's Income And Cost Of Living 
The Trial Court found at page 19 20, paragraph 39 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"All this could easily be done within his current income and 
without further assistance." 
Once again, the court concluded without evidence, that the personal cost of living in 
assisted living centers was covered by Medicare. The Trial Court's maintenance order 
specifically includes and expands this error, by stating that the $600.00 per month maintenance 
terminates upon entry into an "assisted living" or nursing home facility. 
7. Finding Regarding Quality Of Life At Nursing Home 
The Trial Court found at page 20, paragraph 39 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"The quality of a person's life can be very high in such a facility." 
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There was no testimony at trial describing the virtues of assisted living centers, and 
whether people residing in such facilities considered the quality of their life to be very high. I 
suspect many would take issue with this statement in particular as it pertains to nursing homes. 
8. Finding Regarding Government Assistance And Rocky's Support 
The Trial Court found at page 20, paragraph 40 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"Government assistance is substantial and where such assistance is 
available the court must consider these resources as assets and 
means available for Rocky's support whether he chooses them or 
not." ( emphasis added) 
The finding and/or conclusion is not supported by any substantial and competent 
evidence in the record. The court does not identify a single item of government assistance, nor an 
amount which is available to Rocky. It is a bare conclusion without support in the record. The 
only testimony related to the availability of outside resources for a disabled blind man was 
through Rocky's wife Debra. The question and answer presented in Court were as follows: 
Question: "Okay, what facilities in town are you aware of that 
would take people who have the same disabilities that Johnnie has 
that are paid for by Medicare?" (Tr. P. 382 L. 21-24) 
Response: "I went online and I -I can't remember the name of the 
places. I don't have it in front of me, but I did go online to find 
apartments that are not necessarily assisted living centers, but 
apartments that allow for people who are disabled and are on 
Social Security Disability and then I also went online and looked 
to see if there were facilities in town that did offer some assisted 
living, you know, nurses that come in but you have like to own 
your little apartment and then there's a community of people." 
(Tr. P. 383 L. 15-24) 
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9. Finding Regarding Rocky's Means Of Support 
The Trial Court found at page 20, paragraph 40 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"Rocky's only means of support is his disability payment of 
$1315.00 per month and his eligibility for other government 
assistance." 
There was no evidence presented that Rocky was entitled to or was eligible for any other 
government assistance. There was no evidence as to any amounts or financial benefits 
attributable to him even if such were true. This finding is clearly erroneous. 
10. Finding Regarding Rocky's Tangible Assets And Government Resources 
The Trial Court found at page 20, paragraph 41 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"Rocky will have these tangible assets in addition to his 
governmental resources." 
This is a finding unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. There is no 
evidence in the record establish any government resource Rocky was eligible for, or if eligible, 
the amount of the resource. 
11. Finding Regarding Court's Assignment Of Fault In Divorce To Rocky 
The Trial Court found at pages 20 21, paragraph 41 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"The parties agreed to have the divorce granted on essentially no 
fault grounds, yet the courts conclusion is that were the grounds 
left for decision by the court, the court would have faulted Rocky's 
behavior and attitudes for the divorce." 
The court made no findings of fact with regard to this conclusion. There is no way to 
clearly determine what facts support this conclusion. The evidence of fault was meager and 
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minor, much occurring seventeen (17) to eighteen (18) years earlier. Further, the Trial Court 
failed to identify what fault under Idaho Code§ 32-603 it found. 
Rocky submits that the evidence on fault improperly admitted was of such an 
insignificant nature that it does not justify the Trial Court's perception of Rocky. 
12. Finding Regarding Rocky's Request For Asset Distribution And Support 
The Trial Court found at page 21, paragraph 43 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"Rocky's request from the court for distribution of most of the 
assets, none of the debts and lifetime support shock the common 
sense of the court." 
This finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Trial Court 
made no finding as to why a blind disabled man's request for an unequal division and lifetime 
maintenance shocked the common sense of the court. The conclusion conveys the state of mind 
and personal feelings of the Magistrate, as opposed to conclusions based on fact and law. This 
conclusion is not based upon objective facts, but an attitudinal perception only. 
13. Finding Regarding Attorney's Fees 
The Trial Court found at page 21, paragraph 43 of its Memorandum Decision: 
"This case went to trial because rocky wanted a pound of flesh. He 
didn't get it, and he is not getting attorney fees either." 
Counsel for Rocky wishes to submit and respectfully inform the court that the attorney 
for the appellant has a genuine and deep respect for the presiding Magistrate, and has no wish to 
offend. However, these types of conclusions may well qualify as a situation referred to by the 
Supreme Court, Dondelinger, supra, which may have been avoided by appropriate findings of 
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fact and conclusions oflaw. Rocky respectfully submits that the Afemorandum Decision 
contains subjective or attitude-influenced perceptions of the case, without objective basis. 
There is no evidence supporting this finding. The Trial Court disregarded and discounted 
Rocky's blindness, disability, unemployability, lack of a residence, and minimal assets and 
concluded that Rocky's wishes were only based upon vindictiveness. Once again, this finding is 
a reflection of the feelings of the Magistrate personally, and not based on substantial and 
competent evidence. The court made no clear findings with regard to Idaho Code §§ 32-704 and 
32-705, other than as contained in its Memorandum Decision, pages 21 22, paragraph 43. 
D. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS 
CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
1. The court failed to make a finding that the defendant did not have sufficient 
property and income to enable him to care for his future personal needs. 
2. The court failed to analyze and make findings as to Debra's ability and 
opportunity to dispose of non essential assets to decrease her monthly expenses. Debra's 
financial statement included in Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, to identify additional resources available to 
provide maintenance to Rocky. A review of Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 indicates several expenses 
which can be eliminated or reduced. 
The Court erred in permitting the Debra to continue a lifestyle with recreational vehicles, 
extra vehicles, and savings, instead of requiring the defendant to liquidate unessential assets to 
enable her to pay substantial and permanent maintenance. 
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3. A portion of Debra's outstanding debt could be reduced by selling personal assets 
unnecessary for her standard of living. Debra testified she was residing with her boyfriend, and 
paying him only $550.00 per month. (Tr. P. 68, L. 13) There was no evidence that this would 
not continue in the future. The court should have maximized the parties' assets by placing the 
home for sale, at Rocky's uncontested opinion of value of $300,000.00. Debra resides with her 
boyfriend and Rocky cannot afford the home. The elimination of the mortgage debt would result 
in a potential savings of $1,250.00 per month. Debra also had a recreational vehicle with a 
payment of $221.00 per month; (Tr. P. 62, L. 9-14) and a new big screen television payment as 
well as a payment for a new refrigerator. Debra was also contributing to a TSA saving plan in the 
sum of $150.00 per month. (Tr. P. 88, L. 3) Debra further agreed she could discontinue a 
FSAHC Plan which cost her $115.00 per month, (Tr. P. 88, L. 5) and that the costs for health 
insurance would decrease upon divorce. Debra further requested to retain the home which has a 
mortgage payment of $1,800.00 per month, and utilized that figure to justify not being able to 
pay maintenance. The court failed to make findings of fact as to the excess available if these 
expenses were eliminated and the house sold. Were the house sold, it could conceivable provide 
Debra an additional $1,250.00 per month for alimony. 
E. THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT REQUIRED 
FOR ANALYSIS OF IDAHO CODE §§ 32-704 AND 32-705 
The court omitted entirely the elements ofldaho Code§§ 32-704 and 32-705. However, 
the necessary components to satisfy the requirement for attorney fees are clearly available from 
the record. If the court disregards the Trial Court's erroneous conclusion that Rocky has 
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"government resources", Rocky's only source of income is his net Social Security income is 
$1,090.00 per month. The Trial Court correctly found that Rocky was not employable, and that 
his condition will worsen. (Memorandum Decision, Pages 8 - 10, Paragraphs 19, 20, 21 and 22). 
The Trial Court found that Debra earns $95,400.00 per year. However, the trial testimony of 
Debra was that her income was $98,187.00; (Tr. P.82, L. 16-20). The court accepted without 
question Debra's discretionary deductions for life insurance, savings and prepaid medical to 
arrive at a net pay of $5,327.36 per month. The court accepted Debra's budget, which included 
savings and payments on recreational vehicles, at $4,723.53. Debra's budget, (Plaintiffs Exhibit 
6) contains includes the following: 
Debra's Monthly Take home pay: $4,916.00 (Note: Court found $5,327.36) 
House payment: $1,800.00 (should have been ordered sold) 
Trailer payment: $225.97 (recreational vehicle which can be sold) 
Pickup Payment: $616.00 (used to pull trailer, not primary source of transportation) 
Debra testified that the reason she needs the pickup is to pull the camp trailer, and that 
she and her boyfriend are using the trailer; that she could sell them both if she wanted to; that she 
has a car which is reliable transportation; that she wants the pickup and trailer for recreation; that 
she could sell them both and reduce her debt. (Tr. P. 105, L. 17-25: P. 109, L. 17 - 25; 
P. 110, L. 1-8) 
If the home were sold, and the proceeds used to pay off the mortgage, and if the pickup 
and trailer were sold, those figures combined with the $150.00 Debra is placing in savings each 
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month result in to a total of $2,310.00 available funds for payment of maintenance. Debra will 
argue that the parties are upside down on the home, which is a matter yet to be determined, as the 
home has not been placed on the market for any such determination to be made. 
Debra is 53 years of age, earning over $98,000.00 per year, and enjoying her life with 
two vehicles, a travel trailer, living with her boyfriend, saving money each month, and insisting 
on relegating Rocky to an assisted living center for which she erroneously believes Medicare will 
pay. Our society expects better treatment of long term spouses, and as a result invoked statutory 
resources to protect them. 
The Trial Court failed to make the essential finding required by Idaho Code § 32-704 
pertaining to attorney fees. Rocky testified he had no way to pay his attorney fees, and asked that 
Debra pay them. Rocky stated that if he had to pay his fees, he would have to liquidate his share 
of the retirement, and use it for fees, leaving him little left. (Tr. P. 365, L. 15-24) 
Current statutes now mandate that courts in divorce proceedings consider elements 
besides necessity and value of assets awarded in property division in deciding whether award of 
attorney fees is appropriate to that spouse. Idaho Code§§ 32-704(3) and 32-705. Each parties' 
"financial resources" remains a primary factor in evaluation of request for attorney fees in 
divorce action. However that term means more than balance sheet assets; in its broader meaning, 
it includes income and earning capacity. Idaho Code§§ 32-704(3), 32-705, Stephens v. Stephens 
138 Idaho 195, 61 P.3d 63 (2002) 
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There are numerous appellate decisions stating that a disparity in the income of the 
parties is generally sufficient to justify an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 32-704. 
Jensen v. Jensen, supra, Pieper v. Pieper, supra. 
In its amended form, Idaho Code § 32-704(3) now directs the trial courts to look at not 
only the financial resources of the parties but also "the factors set forth in [Idaho Code] 
§ 32-705," which are enumerated above. Plainly, the current statutes now mandate that courts in 
divorce proceedings consider elements besides necessity and the value of assets awarded in the 
property division in deciding whether an award of attorney fees is appropriate. Stephens v. 
Stephens, supra 
F. THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE A FINDING OF FACT OR 
CONCLUSION OF LAW RELATING TO THE PARTIES 
GROUNDS AND DIVORCE 
The court failed to make a finding of fact or conclusion of law as to its apparent finding 
of fault. The court erred in considering evidence of fault when fault was not pled, and further did 
not make a conclusion of law as to which fault ground under Idaho Code § 32-603 it found. The 
court did not identify the evidence which it considered as competent and substantial evidence of 
fault. 
G. ERRORS OF LAW 
1. The Court Erred In Admitting And Finding Fault 
The court recognized each party sought and pled for divorce exclusively on the ground of 
irreconcilable differences. Neither alleged a fault. At trial, the court permitted evidence of fault, 
over objection, indicating it was for purposes of maintenance. The court disregarded the 
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pleadings and permitted evidence of fault. The court concluded as a matter of law that there 
was fault on the part of Rocky, without identifying the fault, nor identifying what the fault 
consisted of. The magistrate court erred in allowing fault evidence, and secondly, utilizing 
unspecified, uncharacterized, generalized fault as a basis to deny maintenance and attorney fees. 
Though fault was not pled, the court devoted pages 5 through 8, as well as pages 13 and 15 of the 
22 total pages in its Memorandum Decision to find fault. Counsel for Rocky objected several 
times, finally obtaining the court's permission for a continuing objection to fault testimony. (Tr. 
P. 24, L. 12, P. 30, L. 10-14) 
Rocky's counsel argued that fault per Idaho law requires notice and proof of a specific 
type of fault, i.e. adultery or extreme cruelty. Counsel for Rocky argued that unless Debra 
alleged a fault ground, and provide a specific fault ground that it was error to consider minor 
disagreements or disputes as a factor for determining maintenance. (Tr. P. 27, L. 4) 
The court responded: "where the grounds are irreconcilable differences normally that 
takes care of it, but I'm going to allow the question and the answer for whatever weight it is 
given". (Tr. P. 25, L.11) 
If the court was correct in admitting fault not pled, the court erred in not making a finding 
with regard to the Debra's admission of adultery. (Tr. P. 369, L. 11-18) 
The court committed error by disregarding Idaho Code § 32-603, by failing to identify 
and characterize the fault. 
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2. The Court Erred In Denying Fees And Costs Based On A Conclusion Of 
Fault, And An Erroneous Conclusion That Rocky Was Entitled To 
Government Benefits 
The court failed to address the elements ofldaho Code §§ 32-704 and 32-705 adequately. 
The court did not find specific fault, nor declare the plaintiff to be an innocent spouse. Further, 
the denial of attorney fees was partially due to the court's erroneous and unsupported finding that 
Medicare pays for assisted living centers. Neither fault nor Medicare coverage, nor availability 
of government assistance should have been an element of the Idaho Code § 32-704 analysis, if 
made. 
3. The Court Committed An Error Of Law By Failing To Order The Home 
Sold, And By Awarding The Home To One Of The Parties At A Disputed 
Value 
There was no expert testimony with regard to the value of the home. Debra's opinion 
was based entirely upon what she earlier viewed as a market analysis prepared by a real estate 
agent, and Rocky based his opinion that the home was valued at over $350,000.00 based upon an 
appraisal the parties obtained three years earlier. The market analysis was submitted to the court 
by Rocky in June, 2012, in response to a pretrial order January 30, 2012. The pretrial order 
stated in summary, that if the divorce involved a division of property and debt, that the parties 
were required to do one of the following within 21 days: 
a. File a notice stating they do not own real estate. 
b. File a stipulation as to the vale and interests. 
c. File a notice if the parties desire the court appoint and expert witness to appraise. 
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Neither party produced an expert as to the value of the home, but each testified as to his 
or her value of their real estate. Rocky testified that his home was appraised 3 years earlier, for 
an amount in excess of $300,000.00. There was also a question as to whether the appraisal 
included the barn. (Tr. P. 101, L. 16 -25; P. 201, L. 1-11) 
The sale of the house would free up funds for maintenance by eliminating the large 
encumbrance and the monthly payment thereon. The comi left Rocky as a obligor on the home 
for the rest of his life, thereby prohibiting him from acquiring another home if he were able. Left 
as is, Rocky will never have a home. 
Rocky testified that the parties refinanced the home three years previously and the value 
then was $350,000.00. Rocky testified that this value was obtained via an actual appraisal and 
that the appraisal was obtained three (3) years earlier. (Tr. P. 293, L. 16-25; P. 294, L. 1-3) 
Rocky testified that he did not believe the market decreased significantly on "horse property" 
such as this. (Tr. P. 294, L. 4-13) Rocky described the property as a 4,200 square foot home on 
four (4) acres with water rights, irrigation systems, two car garage and barn. (Tr. P. 294, L. 11-
25) Rocky requested that the home be listed for sale, and that the price reduced periodically if 
necessary until it could be sold. (Tr. P. 296, L. 5-9) 
Debra submitted no other evidence of value. 
H. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DID NOT REQUIRE AN EQUALIZATION PAYMENT 
FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT 
The personal property division between Debra and Rocky is not equal. Debra is 
receiving $21,492.00 in personal property and Rocky is receiving $16,925.00 in personal 
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property. The Decree must to reflect an equalization payment from Debra to Rocky in the sum 
of$2,283.50 ($21,492.00 - $16,925.00 = $4,567.00 + 2 = $2,283.50) (See Decree of Divorce, 
Exhibit "C", page 8 and Exhibit "D", page 9) 
This matter was brought before the court, post Decree at hearing on Defendant's 
Objection To Entry Of Divorce Decree. The court denied the motion without explanation. 
I. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO 
AWARD ROCKY LIFETIME MAINTENANCE 
The court ordered that Debra pay to Rocky $600.00 per month in maintenance, which 
was to terminate at the end of five (5) years or Rocky's admission into any assisted living center 
or nursing home, whichever was sooner. This sum provides Rocky with only $1,697.00 net 
income on which to live. The denial of Rocky's request for fees will cause him to pay a 
substantial portion of his only asset to his attorney. Rocky cannot survive on the combined sum 
of $1,097.00 from Social Security Disability (net) and the $600.00 maintenance award. As stated 
by the court Rocky will be "cast on public welfare rolls and deprived of dignity and self respect 
healthy people take for granted." 
Rocky is an active productive individual who has much to offer. Rocky is only 57 years 
old. Rocky is bright, intelligent, and has a lot of ambition. Rocky is capable of performing work 
around a house, maintenance, and many things which give him joy. Rocky is adamant that he 
does not want to be immediately stored away in a nursing home for the rest of his life. Rocky 
wants and deserves to enjoy the rest of his life and be busy doing things he likes and is able to 
do. 
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Before moving here, though blind, he tutored at Agothay Christian School, where he was 
acting vice principal in title. Rocky helped design and build cabinets and remodel the kitchen. 
(Tr. P. 1 70 - 172) 
After purchasing their home, though blind and disabled, Rocky methodically hauled rock 
from neighbors' properties and decorated around trees, lined ditches, and fence lines; he dug up 
rocks and lined them around trees. Rocky taught kids how to shoe horses; helped a neighbor 
build cabinets in his garage; (Tr. P. 172) and built wood forms for cement culverts on his 
property. (Tr. P. 174, L. 1-6) Rocky uses live-in students and individuals for house care and meal 
preparation in return for rent. (Tr. P. 176, L. 1-15) Rocky can cook many items with the use of 
the microwave. (Tr. P. 177). A Home Health nurse visits Rocky regularly to make sure his needs 
are met. (Tr. P. 180-181) Rocky does his own laundry. (Tr. P. 182, L. 9-10). Rocky can use a 
computer and uses a magnifying glass to read. (Tr. P. 185) Rocky can drive a four wheeler, fmd 
his way around house, and navigate a riding lawn mower. (Tr. P. 190) Rocky has never been 
house bound, and is active outside continually. (Tr. P. 191) Rocky spent two years hauling 
rocks. He fed horses, dogs, and kept busy. Rocky spent roughly six (6) hours a day outside doing 
something constructive. (Tr. P. 231, L. 12-25) Rocky completed the electrical work in the 
parties' barn, over a four month period in the cold of winter. (Tr. P .232, L. 14-16) Rocky stated 
that he spent seven (7) years improving the outside of his property, memorized the entire piece 
mentally, crawled every inch of the property both praying on it for his family and building on it. 
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Rocky has memorized the house so that he can find his way around it well. This includes the 
house, outside areas, and the barn. It is all he knows and he wants to stay. 
(Tr. P. 235, L. 5-15) 
Expert testimony was provided by Dr. Richard Taylor, a vocational rehabilitation expert 
and director of the Disability Services at BYU Idaho. Dr. Taylor thoroughly evaluated Rocky 
and concluded that Rocky was occupationally disabled, and unable to work be employed in a 
competitive labor market. (Tr. P. 200, L. 3-8) Defendant's Exhibit B, contains Dr. Taylor's 
report of his evaluation of Rocky and was admitted as evidence. Dr. Taylor concluded that 
Rocky was capable of volunteer work, but that his condition would not improve. Dr. Taylor 
described Rocky adeptly: 
"Social Security Disability or other forms of disability doesn't 
mean that they are absolutely handicapped to the point they can't 
do anything. It just means the idea of pace and persistence and 
ability to work a full workday and the limitations imposed prevent 
them from doing the kinds of jobs that are found in the competitive 
labor market .... There's a great deal of difference between the 
competitive labor market and folks who work even in sheltered 
environment, let alone people who volunteer to do things. It's 
really not the same." (Tr. P. 203, L. 11) 
The Idaho Appellate Court was faced with a similar appeal in Hentges v. Hentges, 115 
Idaho 192, 765 P.2d 1094 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). In Henteges, Bill was disabled, unemployable, 
saddled with ongoing expenses, requiring a greater share of the community property. It was a 
nineteen (I 9) year marriage, The Hentges court ordered a substantially unequal division of 
property. The court empathized with the disabled spouse, and commented that the substantial 
unequal division was morally required: 
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"In this sense it gave him, so far as money suffices, a measure of 
dignity and independence that healthy people take for granted." 
Henges, supra 
Primary consideration in awarding maintenance is financial condition of parties. Tisdale 
v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331,900 P.2d 807 (1995) 
One should not be cast onto public assistance rolls and become a burden on society if he 
or she is unable to care for her or his self and the former spouse has the ability to contribute to 
her support and maintenance. Olsen v. Olsen, 98 Idaho 10,557 P.2d 604 (S.Ct. 1976) 
A spouse is entitled to spousal maintenance, where marital and separate property 
accorded to spouse in divorce action and spouse's potential employment opportunities are 
insufficient to day-to-day needs. Theiss v. Theiss, 112 Idaho 681, 735 P.2d 992 (1987) 
Idaho Courts have historically awarded long term disabled spouses permanent alimony 
where they were unable to meet their needs through the property awarded and their future 
income. McNelis v. McNelis, 119 Idaho 349, 806 P.2d 442 (1991); Mulch v. Mulch, 125 Idaho 
93, 567 P .2d 967 (S. Ct. 1995); Ross v. Ross, 103 Idaho 406, 648 P .2d 1119 (1982); Sullivan v. 
Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737,639 P.2d 435 (Idaho 1981) 
This finding is not objectively based in the record, and is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
J. THE COURT ERRED IN LAW BY CONCLUDING 
ROCKY WAS GUILTY OF FAULT 
Debra's counsel elicited questions regarding a volatile relationship over continuous 
objection. Fault was not pled, and cannot be an issue at trial. (Tr. P. 25 26). Upon Rocky's 
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counsel's objections to testimony regarding any alleged fault, the court responded on page 27 
lines 1-5: 
Court: "well I'm going to give you some leeway on that because 
the statute does say in paragraph (g) to sub paragraph 2 of 
§ 32-705 does discuss fault, but I agree with you to a certain extent 
Mr. Swafford so I am going to give you some leeway, but I don't 
want to spend too much time here. (Tr. P. 27, L. 1-5.) 
The Trial Court permitted continuation of testimony of eighteen (18) alleged events 
occurring eighteen (18) years earlier. Counsel for Defendant requested and was granted a 
continuing objection with regard to all fault testimony. (Tr. P. 30, L. 10-14) 
The Trial Court concluded summarily without any specific findings, that Rocky was at 
fault, and expounded upon it at length in its Memorandum Decision, on Pages 13-14, Paragraph 
27 and Pages 20-22, Paragraphs 41 and 43. 
Description Of Alleged Fault Testimony: 
Debra was permitted to continue testifying about fault over objection as stated above. A 
description of the fault shows that even if properly considered, did not rise to a degree of extreme 
cruelty or any of the fault grounds included in Idaho Code§ 32-605. Specific incidents testified 
to are as follows: 
a. In 1994 one year after their marriage in 1993, the Rocky was shopping 
with their daughter in a mall, purchasing a present for her mother, and 
Rocky said if you spill the beans and spoil the surprise, I'll break your 
face. (Objected to and overruled) (Tr. P. 27, L. 21-25 and P. 28, Lines 1-
8) 
b. In 1995, seventeen (17) years ago, Rocky was accused of putting fist 
through a door. (Tr. P. 31, L. 2) 
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c. In 1995, seventeen (17) years ago, Rocky said he was going to beat the 
shit out of their daughter, and started after her. (Tr. P. 31, L. 12-23) 
(Denied by Rocky Tr. P. 261, L. 1-9) 
d. Eighteen (18) months earlier when their daughter Casey was twenty-five 
(25) years of age, she was in the hospital for four ( 4) weeks and Johnny 
(Rocky) only visited her once. (Tr. P. 34, L. 25; P. 35, L. 1-5.) 
e. Debra was in the hospital October 2008 to have gallbladder removed, 
Rocky didn't come to the hospital. (Tr. P. 35, L 7-24) Rocky testified that 
he had recently had organ transplants, and was taking anti-rejection 
medication. Rocky was advised to stay away from ill people. Rocky had 
her dog taken up to visit her, and talked to her every day by phone. 
f. Debra alleged that Rocky went to the barn to commit suicide after he 
learned of her affair and her request for a divorce. Debra testified police 
came and took him to the Behavioral Health Center. (Tr. P. 37, 
L. 12-22) Debra also testified that Rocky had threatened suicide three 
times before. (Tr. P. 38, L. 16-19) Rocky testified that he did not, but that 
Debra was encouraging him to, and giving him alcohol to drink. 
(Tr. P. 222, L. 10-18; P. 223, L. 7-13; P. 224, L. 7-10.) He testified that he 
has never threatened suicide. Rocky admitted that he loved his wife very 
much, and felt like he would die without her. Rocky testified: "I'll die if 
you go, I meant that's the way I feel. I feel like I am dying right now" 
(Tr. P. 393, L. 1-4) 
g. Debra testified that after she filed for divorce, she moved downstairs in the 
basement, and Rocky took her clothes and put them in plastic bags and put 
them in the yard, where she picked them up. (Tr. P. 3 9, L. 1-11) Rocky 
testified that she was leaving the home and spending the weekends with 
her boyfriend and lying to him about it. Finally he put her clothes in bags 
and sat them on the front porch. Rocky did not throw them on the yard. 
(Tr. P. 265, L. 1-25; P. 266, L. 8-10). Rocky indicated he was very, very 
sad and depressed, and asked her what he had done wrong. Debra never 
explained or told him. (Tr. P. 266, L. 25; P. 267, L. 1-15) 
h. Debra testified that eighteen (18) months ago when her adult daughter 
Casey came home from the hospital, she entered the bedroom where 
Rocky was without asking permission and Rocky became angry at her. 
(Tr. P. 34, L. 18-24) 
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Rocky's attorney renewed his motion to strike all of the "fault" testimony, which was 
denied. (Tr. P. 39, L. 20-25; P. 40, L. 1) 
It is submitted that that if all of the allegations were completely true, that Rocky's 
behavior falls far short of extreme cruelty or any fault ground recognized by Idaho law. 
K. THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING 
MAINTENANCE WITH PUBLIC WELFARE 
Rocky is asking this court for justice and fairness. Rocky wants to live a productive life. 
As the court in Hentges, supra, stated, he simply wants his wife of nineteen (19) years to have 
the consideration and decency to help him financially such. In this sense it gives him, so far as 
money suffices, a measure of dignity and independence that healthy people take for granted. 
Rocky is 57 years old, disabled, blind and alone, after 19 years of marriage. The wife 
that he loved dearly left him for another man with whom she resided during the last year of 
marriage. These events are horrific for Rocky, but not as horrific as the thought that the 
magistrate sees him as a useless human being that should be put in a nursing home to die. 
His wife of nineteen (19) years makes nearly $100,000.00 per year; has paid vacations, 
insurance, an expensive recreational vehicle with pickup to pull it to enjoy with her boyfriend. 
She has many years ahead to work. Debra is 53 years old, and will make approximately 1.3 
million dollars in the next 13 years before retirement. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The combination of marriage vows, long term marriages, age and disability are critical 
factors in the life of a married couple. Few of us can ever comprehend the strength it takes for 
Rocky to face each day, and the strength to fight depression and futility. 
Rocky does not ask for recreational vehicles, expensive vacations, fancy cars, fancy 
dinners, nice clothes, an expensive house, nor most of the things most of us enjoy. Rocky wants 
to have value, dignity, a place to live, visit friends, go to church and eat. Rocky is asking for 
alimony for his basic needs. Rocky has been independent all his life. Rocky has a meager 
amount of money from the property division which will be depleted quickly. Once Rocky 
cannot pay for his living expenses, he will be forced into Medicaid, where he will spend the rest 
of his life in a nursing home. If the reader has visited a nursing home, he or she has an 
immediate understanding of the life and home one experiences. Nursing homes are a necessary 
but sad end to one's life. Rocky is not old, and wants to live as productive and active a life as he 
is able. 
The court obviously has perceptions and attitudes about Rocky, which permeate the 
Memorandum Decision throughout. Rocky did not receive a just and fair result at trial. 
Rocky asks this court for relief. Rocky requests the house be listed for sale at a minimum 
price of $300,000.00; that he be permitted to live in the home until it sells. Rocky requests that 
the parties reduce the price periodically if necessary. If after ten (10) months of listing there are 
no offers in excess of the mortgage balance at that time, the Debra may have the home, subject to 
her refinancing it within a reasonable time. Rocky asks the court to award him substantial 
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maintenance to assist him in living a reasonable life. Rocky needs this to be permanent 
maintenance. Rocky further requests the court order an equalization payment and attorney fees 
for the trial below and for this appeal. It is not unreasonable to request his wife of 19 years to sell 
the home, luxury items, stop her savings, and pay a substantial amount for alimony so he too can 
have a semblance of the life most ofus enjoy. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of December, 2013. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day I served two copies of the foregoing document 
upon the designated parties affected thereby as follows: 
Laurie Baird Gaffney, Esq. 
Gaffney Law Office, PLLC 
591 Park Avenue, Suite 302 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2013. 
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